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m THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
BRYAN JAY STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No, 16203 
SAFEWAY STORES, ET AL, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * 
STATEME!NT OF THE NATURE: OF 'IHE CASE 
Bryan Jay Stephens appeals from the Order of Dismissal With Pre-
judice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. 
DISPOSITIOn IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case came on before the Court, Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, 
presiding, on defendant's motion for dismissal. The ~rties argued 
the motion, and submitted affidavits and memoranda of legal authority 
in support of their respective positions. This appeal is brought from 
the final judgment of the Court wherein plaintiff's case was dismissed 
with prejudice pu1~nt to Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. on November 24, 1978. 
Appellant Stephe~~ seeks reversal of the judb~ent of the lower 
Court and an order re~ndi~g the case to the Third Judicial District 
Court for a trial on tne ~erits. 
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\ 
"' 
This appeal seeks reversal of the order of the 'lh1zd. ~,. 
Court dismissing plaintiff's lawsuit with pxejudioe :pi1DU&D\ tt •( 
Rule 41(b) U.R,C.P. after defendant claimed pla1Dtuf' ha4 h1l8l 
to diligently prosecute the action. (R. 24-2.5) 'l'b.e •ttar ... _._ 
mitted to the Court on the file and record in the case, 1Dcl.ud.1Dc 
the affidavits of counsel, memorandums of law, and on oral arjpiMDt. 
(R. 21-2), 26-)2) 
The plaintiff originally sued these same defendants on July 28; 
1971, in case no. 200474. That matter was dismissed without pre-
judice in June, 1972, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, shortl7 
before trial was scheduled, and upon stipulation of defendants. 
Plaintiff filed the instant case, through attorney Richard Day 
on November 1), 1972, claiming damages in excess of $100,000 for 
personal injuries sustained as a result of an assault and battery 
allegedly committed by defendant Safeway Store employees and occurring 
on its premises. (R. 2-4) 
The defendants filed a general denial in answer to the complaint, 
and served interrogatories therewith. (R. 5-10) Attorney Da.y then 
withdrew from the case on December 13, 1972, leaving plaintiff in 
the position of representing hemself. (R. 12, 13) 
Thereafter, during February, 1973, defendants sought to dismiss 
the complaint through motion to compel answers to interrogatories. 
(R. 14,15) Plaintiff appeared in person and was given an additional 
JO days to answer, (R. 17) and then prepared and filed the requested 
answers as best he could. (R. 18-19) Plaintiff then employed his 
prPsent counsel of record Hho entered his appearance on June 28, 1973. 
: ~-... 
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The ·respective attorneys for the parties communicated regarding 
the various aspects of the case at various times during 1973, (R. 29, 
)1) No further proceedings directly involving.the Court were brought 
.. 
by either party until the motion to dismiss which is the subject of 
this appeal was filed by defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE PLAINTIFF SHOWED .nJSTIFIABLE EXCUSE FOR DELAY IN SETTING CASE 
FOR TRIAL, IT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR LOWER COURT TO DISMISS 
WITH PREJUDICE IN ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL SHOWING OF PREJUDICE TO 
DEFENDANT, AND WHERE SAID DISMISSAL RESULTED IN INJUSTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
This Court has recently considered several Rule 4l(b) cases which, 
it is submitted, are dispositive of the issue presently before this 
Court. The leading case, Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (1977) 
has set forth guidelines for determining justifiable excuse for delay. 
Accordingly, this Court must consider the following well-established 
principles: 
1. Conduct of both parties. 
2. The opportunity each has had to move the case forward. 
3. What each of the parties have done to move the case forward. 
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side. 
5. And, most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
These principles are well-established in the followins cases which 
were cited with apyroval in Utah Oil, sup=: See Hestin;hou::;e Electric 
Suuply Co. v. Paul ·,{. Larsen Contractor, Inc., _544 P. 2d 876 (19(7); 
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Polk V, Ivers, 561 P.2d 16?5 (1977); Johnson v. Joirebg.l!!l, .m ]t4 at 
1369 (1977); Crystal Lime &: Cement Co. v. RobbiDB, 5.)8 P.all.)tU _-
(1975). • 
In Johnson v. Firebrand, supra, the action lay tar tour ,_,.. 
without either party taking an active interest in the 11U.t.t.oa, 81111 
a1 though no reasons were given for the delay, the Court bel4 'Uaat it 
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss with- plll~ 
on that ground alone. 
In Westinghouse, supra, this Court reversed a dismissal with~­
judice, and stated: 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch aDd. to 1110'¥8 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is 
even more important to keep in mind that the very rEBson for the exist-
ence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be hM.rd and. 
to do justice between them. In conformity with that principle the 
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments 
where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in sub-
stantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party." 
In the federal courts in Rule 4l(b) cases, it has been pointed out 
that dismissal is a very harsh remedy which should be used only 1n the 
most extreme situations. 
In Flaska v. Little Marine Constr. Co. (1968, CA5 Fla.) J89 F.2d 
885, cert den 392 U.S. 928, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1387, 88 S. Ct. 2287, the Court 
pointed out that dismissal is too harsh a remedy except in extreme 
situations where there is a clear record of delay or con~macious con-
duct by plaintiff, and further stated that the court should first resort 
to the wide raEge of lesser sanctions which keep litigation moving, but 
without depriving the litigant of his day in court. 
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The allegations that plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories 
ma.y be :read.Uyexplli.ned on the basis of the fact that defendant knew 
that plaintiff was not represented by counsel at that time, and that 
defendants were seeking to take advantage of plaintiff while plaintiff 
was acting as his own attorney, 
In applying the principles and guidelines established in this 
jurisdiction, it is obvious that great injustice will be done ·to 
plaintiff by dismissing his meritorious claim. It is clear that he 
has a gpod cause of action against defendants based upon the unprovoked 
assault and battery, during which he sustained severe and permanent 
injuries, and further for the malicious and unwarranted subsequent 
prosecution of plaintiff for abusive language wherein plaintiff was 
acquitted. 
It is fundamental to our system of justice that an injured plaintlif 
be given his day in court, and that he should not be, in effect, de-
faulted, for technical procedural reasons. 
It is not disputed that the defendant has h~d more than an equal 
opportunity to get this case ready for trial. Although defendant claims 
to have been thoroughly prepared for trial of the first case in 1972, 
there h·. nothing to indicate that defendant toolc any action to move the 
case along subsequent to 1973, although they had every opportunity to 
so do. It would appear that defendants had no particular urgency in 
moving the casco foraard, although they admit that their discovery was 
-5-
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complete, their witnesses have been interviewed, &lid are aw.Uabl.e, 
and that they have taken the plaintiff's deposition. 
There have been no facts submitted by defendants which would 111111-
cate that the existing delay in a trial date has prejudiced their cue 
in any way, Their witnesses are persons who reside and woxk 1n tba 
local area. It is believed by plaintiff that these are mainly store 
employees, including off-duty law enforcement officers, and that 110st 
are still available. Much of the testimony which could be elicited 
from such witnesses will be cumulative. Plaintiff believes that those 
witnesses are only relevant as to the liability issues. It is submitted 
that there would be 11 ttle or no difficulty for defendant to proceed to 
a trial on the merits without prejudice due to any delay. 
Plaintiff, through counsel, states to this Court the belief that 
there has been diligent preparation on this case, and that any delay has 
not been unreasonable, in view of the fact that this action involves 
claim for personal injuries, and respectfully points out that there has 
been activity in seeking out competent medical examination and treat-
ment for plaintiff's injuries, 
Plaintiff was seeking to ascertain the necessity for future medical 
attention. Even at the present time, plaintiff suffers from headaches, 
dental problems, and neurological disorders caused by the brutal beating 
he received at the defendants' hands. Plaintiff has been disabled by 
his injuries and has rzd difficulty in finding employment, and in carry-
ing out the norFal functions of his life. 
-6-
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It is submitted that it was not an unreasonable delay to not set 
the matter on for trial prior to ascertaining the true nature and 
extent of plaintiff's injuries, including the question regarding 
the extent of long-term permanent damage. The uncertainty regarding 
plaintiff's condition had a great deal to do with the length of time 
which was allowed to transpire. 
During 1973, plaintiff's counsel had conversations and otherwise 
communicated with defense counsel about this case. He is of the 
opinion that defendants expressed no particular urgency in getting 
this case to trial. On the contrary, the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement was definitely considered, and plaintiff's counsel was left 
with the understanding that these negotiations would continue as 
additional medical information and facts concerning the injuries 
could be developed. Defendants' attorneys have made no attempt to 
contact plaintiff's counsel for several years after the last of these 
discussions. 
It is submitted that it would be unjust and unfair to allow the 
dismissal to stand. uncorrected and unreversed by this court. The 
defendant has suffered no prejudice in going forward with their 
defense, while th~ plaintiff has suffered great injustice. The 
opinions of this court, and the better reasoning and principle of 
t:,e law re'luires that to avoid injustice, this matter must be reversed 
a~d remanded for disposition on the ~erits. 
CO;lCLUSIOli 
Plaintiff res):'2ctfully :::.ubr:Jits tl1c1t tlF' dcch;ion of th·o Third 
-7-
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Dated: April 6, 1979 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
::];:; :s·~~ 
JOHN D. RUSSELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
4JO Judge Bullding 
8 East Bmadway 
Sa.lt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant were served upon Defendant-
Respondent by placing said copies, postage prepaid, in the U,S, 
Mail and addressed to J. Steven Newton, Attorney at Law, 1)6 
South Main Street, Suite 404 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
this _day of April, 1979. 
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